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receipt of remittances has a positive effect on emigration intentions of household members living in the 
country of origin. Therefore, receipt of remittances may contribute to new flows of migration, in particular 
in the case of Morocco.  
 
 
Keywords:  remittances, migration, intentions, altruism, self-interest 
 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Remittances have become a significant source of income for less developed countries. 
According to the World Bank (2004), remittances received by less developed countries in 
2002 totalled 93 billion US dollars. Although the size of remittance flows is undoubtedly 
large, the empirical support for the beneficial effects of remittances on development and 
economic growth is not overwhelming and ambiguous. In a comparative study of 74 less 
developed countries Adams and Page (2003) found that remittances have a strong impact 
on reducing poverty. However, Chami et al. (2005) - using panel data of 113 less 
developed countries - show that remittances have a negative effect on economic growth. 
They suggest that the moral hazard problems tied to the transfer of money from migrants 
to receiving households may be the key to understanding why remittances engender poor 
economic performance. Recipients can lower their labour force participation or savings, 
limit job search efforts, invest in riskier investment projects or perhaps signal to family 
members staying behind that it is worthwhile to move abroad and join the remitter. 
In short, whether remittances are beneficial or counterproductive depends on how 
remittances are allocated – invested or consumed – and especially how it affects the 
behaviour of recipients. The difficulty with appraising the more macro-economically 
inspired literature is that it makes numerous tacit assumptions about how remittances 
come about and affect household and individual decision making without really testing 
the plausibility of assumptions used. In this paper we will offer some empirical evidence 
which might shed light on the debate about the causes and consequences of remittances.  
To contribute to the debate we will focus on three less developed countries, which are 
known to depend heavily on the inflow of remittances: Egypt, Morocco and Turkey (see 
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Adams and Page, 2003). Migrant remittances in Egypt for the year 1999 constituted 26 
per cent of exports and 4 per cent of GDP. In Turkey and Morocco, the figures are 10 per 
cent and 2.5 per cent, and 18 per cent and 5.5 per cent, respectively. For this purpose we 
use data of a large-scale household survey implemented in the years 1996 and 1997 in 
these countries. The survey contains detailed information on households and to some 
extent information is provided by the households about their emigrant family members. 
The focus of attention is on households who have one or more household members living 
abroad. In particular, we address the following two questions: (1) which factors affect the 
likelihood that such households receive remittances?; and (2) does receipt of remittances 
in households in origin countries encourage or discourage emigration intentions of its 
members? 
In answering the first question, we borrow some insights from a growing body of 
literature which sheds some light on the possible motives behind remittances. We will 
view remittances as a transfer of resources inspired by a mixture of motives ranging from 
pure self- interest to altruism. Essentially we put forward the question whether these flows 
can be interpreted as a sign of altruism or as being part of an implicit contract - be it a 
family loan arrangement or an insurance contract. In the case of altruism, the net earnings 
conditions of the recipients will matter, as well as the strength of family ties. In the case 
of a family loan, one has to imagine the existence of a tacit contract between the 
household and emigrants, whereby the latter promise to repay the loan they received to 
finance their move abroad. The commitment to repay that loan depends very much on the 
family household structure and, just as in the case of the altruism model, on the strength 
of ties between the household members. 
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The second question deals with the effect that receipt of remittances may bring 
about, i.e. whether the transfer of money triggers emigration of household members 
staying behind. We shall test this proposition by examining whether remittances have a 
substantial effect on the emigration intentions of household members with one or more 
fellow household members living abroad. On the one hand, one would predict this effect 
to be negative as the prime function of remittances is to let those staying behind live in 
comfort. The emigration of one of its members can be interpreted as a well-chosen 
household strategy to overcome so-called missing insurance or capital markets (Stark and 
Bloom, 1985). In short, the emigrant becomes an asset for those remaining behind. On 
the other hand, the reverse case may also arise: remittances may signal to those staying 
behind that migration is a profitable undertaking. Uncovering this signalling function of 
remittances is quite difficult since emigration is a complex decision process whereby one 
needs to account for various influences to discover that particular effect. If this effect 
exists, the phenomenon of ‘chain migration’ will arise with even more force since the 
chain between migrants and those staying behind is accompanied by a financial flow 
triggering more migration. Proving or disproving the existence of the signalling function 
is an important step because the popular image of remittances among policy makers is 
that remittances function at the same level as development aid (World Bank, 2004). In 
principle, remittances could have the same beneficial effect as foreign aid because the 
level of remittances in the year 2002 is more than double the level of net official 
assistance (see World Bank, 2004). However, when remittances trigger additional 
emigration the net benefits of remittances are bound to be far less pronounced, if not 
absent. 
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 To put our research questions in context, we start out with a review of a growing 
body of theoretical work that sheds light on the determinants and consequences of 
remittances. 
 
MIGRATION AND THE ROLE OF REMITTANCES  
Emigration is a precondition for remittances to come about and knowing who emigrates 
(e.g., the high skilled or the low skilled) and why is essential for understanding the size, 
direction and consequences of remittance flows. Answering these questions can easily be 
done within the domain of simple equilibrium models of migration in which wage 
differences are the prime driving force. Migration in this view is an adjustment 
mechanism between regions or countries. The volume and direction of migration are 
considered to be primarily driven by wage income differentials. Moving labour across 
borders is in this equilibrium view an arbitrage process just like physical and financial 
capital move across borders to reap the benefits of interest differentials, and as long as 
there differences in wage rates across countries there will be a pressure to migrate. 
A drawback of the early literature on migration (Sjaastad 1962, Todaro, 1969; 
Harris and Todaro 1970) and its focus on migration as an individual choice process was 
that in such models there is in principle no significant role for remittances. All this 
changed with the so-called ‘new economics of labour migration’, as Stark and Bloom 
(1985) dubbed this strand in the migration literature. By moving from models where the 
migrant is motivated solely by individual incentives to models where individual decisions 
are influenced by household characteristics as well as individual characteristics, the issue 
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of remittances arises naturally. As long as migrants remain part of the household in the 
country of origin interaction can continue through the transfer of income or information. 
 
Remittances: altruism or enlightened self-interest?  
The main question about remittances is: why do emigrants send part of their income to 
family and relatives in origin countries? A common explanation is that migrants care for 
the ones they left behind: spouses, children, parents and other members of the extended 
family. A theory of altruism has the attractive feature that it is tractable and leads to 
straightforward predictions, although much depends on the specifics of the model of 
altruism (see Rapoport and Docquier, 2005). With the help of a theory of altruism, in 
which migrants care not only for their own utility but also for the utility of the household 
in the origin country, one can make the prediction that the level of remittances increases 
with the migrant’s income and decreases with the recipient’s income. 
One of the difficulties in testing the theory of altruism is that the predictions made 
are hard to distinguish from the predictions made with alternative theories of remittance 
behaviour. The encompassing feature of those alternative theories is the assumption of 
self- interest as the prime driving force behind remittances. So what appears as mutual 
altruism between the family and the migrant could just as well be enlightened self-
interest. Remittances can serve both the interests of migrants and of the household in the 
origin country. In this set-up remittances are viewed as part of an intertemporal mutually 
beneficial contract arrangement (Lucas and Stark, 1985; Poirine, 1997; VanWey, 2004). 
The elements of investment and risk stand out in this contract theory of remittances. To 
start with the investment argument, it has long been recognised that remittances can be 
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viewed as a repayment of the principal (plus interest) invested by the family for the 
education of the migrant. The higher the investment of the household in the education of 
the migrant, the higher the expectations of the family of being repaid through remittances. 
Migration, in other words, is seen as a portfolio investment strategy. 
The other element of the self- interest view of remittances – the function of 
insurance contract – also points to some common practices in daily life in less developed 
countries. Emigration is not only viewed as a strategy for migrants to benefit from higher 
income opportunities but it can also be viewed as a household risk-diversification 
strategy to overcome missing insurance markets. Remittances viewed as ‘insurance’ 
generates the same predictions as the altruistic model with respect to the appearance of 
adverse income shocks but it yields different predictions with respect to the timing of 
remittances. The altruistic model should imply a gradual decrease of remittances over 
time as altruism decays in distance and time, while the insurance motive should imply no 
decrease during a given (contract) period and a sharp decline after a while when the 
insurance ‘contract’ expires. 
Naturally, in these informal settings the strength of family ties may play a crucial 
role in overcoming the hurdles in financing lifetime consumption paths. Contractual 
arrangements between the migrant and his family are voluntary and thus must be self-
enforcing. 1 Close family relations may serve as such a force. Of course, the strength of 
family ties between the remitter and the recipient household plays also a large role within 
the altruism model, as VanWey (2004) suggests. The ‘altruism’ motive indicates that 
                                                                 
1 We will refer to migrants as being male because most of the empirical research yields the insight that men 
are in general the ones who emigrate. 
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emotional attachment to the  household is important so that remittances reflect a kind of 
‘commitment’ to live up to their promise to take care of their family members. 
Lucas and Stark (1985) suggest a test, which could help to determine whether 
remittances represent altruistic or self- interested behaviour. The family may possess 
sanctions to overcome the hazards tied to long-distance transfers. For instance, a default 
to remit may be sanctioned by denying the migrant rights to future solidarity, inheritance 
or even the right to return to the household, once the migrant retires. In short, such 
sanctions may give the family bargaining power. Within a game-theoretic context, greater 
wealth should enhance the bargaining strength of the family. This yields a clear 
prediction that can challenge the prediction of the pure altruism model. The prediction of 
the latter model is that higher remittances flow to low-wealth households. The prediction 
of the self- interest mode is exactly the reverse: remittances flow to wealthy households. 
 
Table 1  Predictions for the Effects of Explanatory Variables on the Receipt of 
Remittancesa 
 
Explanatory variables Altruism model Self- interest model 
Migrant’s characteristics   
  Income + + 
  Education No prediction + 
  Time since arrival - 0  
Recipient’s characteristics   
  Long-run income - ± 
  Adverse short-run income shocks + + 
  Wealth (land, cattle, real estate, etc.) - + 
Family ties between migrant and household + + 
 
(a) The predicted signs are primarily based on the review of Docquier and Rapoport (2005), who make a 
finer distinction in models. In our table the insurance, investment and strategic inheritance motives are 
summed up under the heading self-interest model. NB: the predicted effects refer to level effects, 
although most of these effects carry over to probability effects. 
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All in all, the predictions made by the two models overlap to some extent, but they also 
vary by a number of distinct driving forces. Table 1 summarises the expected effects of 
these competing models of remittances. 
 
The Link between Remittances and Emigration 
Whether receipt of remittances triggers emigration intentions of non-migrants has been 
spelled out to some extent in theory and either outcome – to emigrate or to stay - can be 
defended. Within the logic of the self- interest model receipt of remittances will have a 
negative effect on the emigration intentions of those staying behind. This is because 
remittances soften the perceived income and insurance constraints of the household so 
that there is no need for additional members to emigrate. The ‘insurance contract’ model 
suggests that if the contract pays off it will sustain household members to live their lives 
in the country of origin. A problem for the migrant-sending household arises when the 
contract is not lived up to by the emigrant. Sending another household member abroad 
involves a certain risk since the ones who stay behind become more dependent on the 
ones that emigrated. Subsequent emigrants from the household may also not be 
financially successful and fail to generate remittances or, as time goes by, feelings of 
commitment to the sending household and community may even diminish. Therefore 
much depends on the success and commitment of the emigrant(s). Controlling for the 
characteristics of migrants residing abroad is therefore an essential step in testing 
hypotheses about the effect of remittances on emigration intentions. 
Another reason why remittances may trigger emigration within the self- interest 
model may be the information contained in the message which households get when 
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receiving money. Remittances also represent information on migration (investment) 
opportunities. For those staying behind it may well be a signal that it pays to emigrate. 
And when information on the destination countries is imperfect and uncertain it helps to 
have a reliable information source abroad. In other words, the money sent home by 
migrants ‘talks’. Remittances contain additional information, which enlarge or dampen 
the great expectations about countries of destination. 
The above view on the link between migration and remittances represents the 
viewpoint of the (head of the) household having command over its members living 
abroad. One can also take the viewpoint of the emigrant who may have ulterior motives 
in sending remittances. For instance, Stark (1999) argues that migrants may wish others 
not to follow in their steps, and these first movers would be willing to pay them to stay 
put. The intuition behind the flow of remittances is quite simple: remittances protect the 
wage income of high-skilled emigrant workers from being ‘contaminated’ by the 
presence of low-skilled workers in the same pool. In other words: the decision for 
migrants to remit is not motivated by altruistic considerations but rather by pure self-
interest. Within that context, the intention to emigrate should be significantly lower 
among household members in remittances-receiving households than such intentions of 
persons in non-receiving households. 
However, Stark and Wang (2002) examine another mechanism which reverses the 
previous prediction. The insight is essentially based on the idea that employers in the 
country of destination distinguish between skill types of migrants. Under those 
circumstances, the first-mover migrants - assumed to be high-skilled or highly 
entrepreneurial - will be willing to pay low-skilled migrants to follow in their footsteps 
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and join them. High-skilled migrants draw benefits from a skill dilution of the pool of 
migrant workers. Testing this idea would imply that persons living in households that 
have received remittances would have a higher probability to emigrate than persons 
living in households that did not receive anything. In addition to this straight-forward 
prediction, one would also need to test the prediction that recipients would be lower 
skilled than the emigrant-remitter. The latter prediction would imply quite detailed 
information on household relations, information that is unfortunately lacking in our data 
set. 
In testing these theories one also needs to control for the complexity of migration 
decision making within the household context. One of the complexities refers to the 
networks which migrants maintain with the country of origin. Network externalities (cf. 
Bauer et al. 2002; Epstein and Gang, 2005) influence whether, when and where new 
emigrants migrate to. For instance, the presence of emigrated relatives abroad generally 
lowers the costs and risks of migration for family and friends who stayed behind because 
emigrants in the destination countries may provide relevant information on travel to and 
arrival in places of destination, they may provide temporary housing, loans and be of help 
in finding paid work (Boyd 1989; Massey et al. 1999; Rotte and Vogler 2000). Thus, size, 
nature and quality of the migrant-network determines the effect that networks have on 
emigration intentions in migrant-sending households in origin countries and the 
likelihood of receiving remittances (Bauer et al. 2000). 
 
DATA AND METHOD 
The data that are used to answer our research questions come from a multi-country study 
investigating determinants and mechanisms of international migration to the European 
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Union. Five sending countries (Ghana, Senegal, Morocco, Egypt, and Turkey) and two 
receiving countries (Spain, Italy) were included, countries belonging to the same 
migration system (cf. Kritz and Zlotnik, 1992), that is, migration to the European Union 
from Africa and the Mediterranean region. 
For this study Egypt, Morocco and Turkey were selected because remittances 
constitute a major source of income in these countries. Regionally representative rather 
than nationally representative sample designs were developed because of financial and 
logistic reasons. In each country, four (Egypt, Turkey) or five (Morocco) study regions 
were purposively identified using a combination of the following criteria: (1) level of 
economic development (relatively high vis-à-vis relatively low development), and (2) 
experience with international migration (long-standing history of migration vis-à-vis 
recent history). For each region specific sampling frames were developed. The samples 
taken were stratified, multistage cluster samples of non-migrant and migrant households, 
whereby the latter were over-sampled. 2 
Table 2 summarises survey statistics and the typology of households that was 
used as the basis for the analyses. In principle, all persons between 18 and 65 years old in 
the household were interviewed, including all emigrants living abroad (so-called 
‘shadow’ household members). To increase the likelihood of interviewing an emigrant in 
person in a sending household, the timing of data collection was carefully chosen, for 
instance during vacation periods when many emigrants return to the sending country 
visiting their family. Otherwise, a proxy person answered a selected number of questions 
of the absentee emigrants.  
 
                                                                 
2  See for a more extensive description of the sampling methodology, Groenewold and Bilsborrow (2004) 
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Table 2 Timing and distribution of screened, sampled and interviewed households and 
of eligible persons, according to migration status of households, in Egypt, Morocco and 
Turkey 
 
 Egypt 
(April-May 1997) 
Morocco 
(June-October 
1997) 
Turkey 
(July-September 
1996) 
Households screened 27,438 4,512 12,838 
Households in the sample 2,588 2,030 1,773 
Households interviewed, of which: 1,943 1,952 1,564 
   Non-migrant households a 617 493 735 
   Migrant sending households b 490 1,179 414 
   Return -migrant households c 675 177 291 
   Mixed-migrant households d 161 103 124 
Persons interviewed, of which: 6,430 3,588 4,680 
   Non-migrant 4,630 1,913 3,445 
   Current-migrant  776 1,421 760 
   Return -migrant 1,024 254 475 
a Non-migrant households are households which consist only of persons without international 
migration experience (i.e. non-migrants) and dependants (i.e. persons below age 18 or above age 
65).  
b Migrant-sending households consist of emigrants and of non-migrants and dependants. 
c Return migrant households are households which consist of members who were once emigrant 
but who returned to the sending household (i.e.  return migrants), whereas non-migrants and 
dependants may also be part of the household. 
d Mixed migrant households include both emigrants and return migrants, whereas non-migrants and 
dependants may also be part of the household.  
 
 
 
Models 
In testing the relevance of the self- interest and altruism models in the receipt of 
remittances we will use the migrant-sending household in the country of origin as the 
principal actor. This sub-population has been explicitly chosen as our focus, and not other 
sub-populations as listed in Table 2, because decisions will not be influenced by 
household members who have a migration history as would be the case if we included 
return-migrant households or mixed migrant households. The effects, especially with 
respect to emigration intentions, will not be contaminated by the inclusion of return 
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migrants, who are known to have higher probabilities of emigration (see Schoorl et al. 
2000). 
Most studies examine determinants of remittances from the perspective of the 
emigrant who has to decide how much to remit (Hoddinott, 1994; Funkhouser, 1995; and 
Agarwal and Horowitz, 2003; VanWey, 2004). However, because the surveys conducted 
in the countries of origin generated information on both the migrant-sending household as 
well as their shadow household members abroad, we examine the determinants of 
remittances from the perspective of these migrant-sending household.  With respect to the 
question whether remittances are inspired by altruism or enlightened self- interest we 
focus on the likelihood that such migrant-sending households receive remittances from 
their shadow household members, although it is not known exactly from which shadow 
household members the remittances come from. The following equation is used to 
examine the probability that a household receives remittances: 
 
iiEiHi EHR ebb ++=        (1) 
 
where Ri = 1 if anyone in the household received money in the past twelve months from 
household members living abroad, and the variable takes on the value zero if the 
household did not receive any money from migrant household members. The likelihood 
depends on a vector of household characteristics (Hi), representing its net earnings 
capacity and wealth of the household, and a vector of characteristics (Ei) describing the 
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net earnings capacity of the emigrant(s) linked to the household and the strength of the 
link between emigrants and their household, and a normally distributed error term e.3 
With respect to the question whether remittances encourage or discourage 
migration we will use stated emigration intentions of non-migrants in migrant-sending 
households to test this idea and the following equation will then be estimated: 
 
iiEiHiIiRi EHIRM nbbbb ++++=      (2) 
 
where Mi = 1 if the non-migrant has an intention to emigrate and zero if the non-migrant 
has no intention to emigrate, Ei and Hi are the vectors of relevant characteristics of the 
emigrant and the migrant-sending household, and ni is the error term. We focus on 
household members, between the age of 18 and 65 years, who have no prior international 
migration experience and who are part of a migrant-sending household (i.e. non-
migrants). Because of the focus on individual household members a vector of individual 
characteristics (Ii) is added to the model to control for the effects that age, sex, marital 
status, work status and education may have on the formation of emigration intentions. 
The main focus is, of course, on the coefficient bR representing the trigger effect of 
remittances. If remittances perform their function well the coefficient should be bR £ 0, 
whereas if the trigger or signal function is working it should be the reverse case: bR > 0.  
 
 
                                                                 
3 Estimating remittance models can be hindered by the problem of sample selection as emigration itself is a 
highly selective process and the returns from those migrants sent home should also generate some 
selectivity in observation. However, most remittance decision models refer to the level of remittances and 
not to the likelihood of receiving remittances, so that selectivity in our set-up is expected to be negligible. 
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Descriptive statistics 
The mean characteristics of the migrant-sending households, the emigrant or shadow 
family members and individual members of migrant-sending households in Egypt, 
Morocco and Turkey are summarised in Table 3. Although most of the statistics and 
variable definitions are self-explanatory, a few comments about the context of migration 
and remittances are given in order to understand these statistics and the subsequent 
estimation results. 
The context of migration is quite different in the three countries. Prior analysis of 
the data (Schoorl et al. 2000) shows that most Egyptian emigrants move to the oil-
producing states in the Middle East: Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Kuwait. They are mainly 
migrant-workers, contracted by firms in these countries. Conversely, Moroccan and 
Turkish emigrants move to European countries with the purpose of staying there on a 
more permanent basis, legal or illegal, following in the footsteps of family and friends. 
About two third of the migrant-sending households receive remittances. The median 
value of remittances received by these households in the twelve months period preceding 
the surveys is $423 in Egypt, $1352 in Morocco, and $401 in Turkey. 4  Furthermore, 75 
to 92 per cent of the households in Egypt, Turkey and Morocco report that remittances 
are mainly used to finance the daily costs of living, such as food, clothing, rent, etc. 
 
 
 
                                                                 
4 Non-response was high on the question about amounts of remittances received: Egypt 45 per cent, 
Morocco 32 per cent, and Turkey 62 per cent.  The minimum amount recorded was about US$ 60. 
Conversion of reported remittances in US dollars is based on average of daily (cash) exchange rates for the 
365 days period preceding the first day of the survey plus the number of days used to collect the survey 
data. 
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Table 3 Descriptive statistics 
 Egypt Morocco Turkey 
Variables characterising the household    
Migrant sending households having received remittances from abroad (%) 
(received nothing in the past year = 0) 
56.9 78.3 57.9 
Presence of persons below age 18 (%) (none = 0) 83.4 79.8 83.6 
Presence of persons above age 65 (%) (none = 0) 24.3 17.0 21.8 
Household size, excluding emigrants (in persons) 5.8 5.0 5.3 
Age head of household (in years) 42.4 39.9 41.7 
Female head of household (%) (male head = 0) 74.8 59.7 63.6 
Level of education head of household (%)    
    No education (= 0) 65.5 76.3 46.1 
    Primary education 13.8 15.8 48.2 
    Secondary education 12.7 5.1 4.3 
    Higher than secondary education 8.0 2.8 1.4 
Perceived income situation (%)    
    Sufficient (= 0) 77.2 72.3 28.3 
    Insufficient 4.0 3.6 25.0 
    Barely sufficient 18.8 24.1 46.7 
Wealth indexa -0.14 0.26 -0.07 
Rural (%) (urban residence = 0) 63.6 33.5 65.7 
Variables relating to emigrant(s) tied to households     
Average age of emigrants (in years) 35.5 33.6 30.0 
Number of emigrants who are related to reference person as:    
    Spouse 0.44 0.44 0.38 
    Children 0.45 0.47 0.57 
    Parents 0.03 0.15 0.02 
    Brother/sisters  0.13 0.21 0.18 
Number of married emigrants 0.82 1.00 0.90 
Number of emigrants in:    
    Europe 0.15 1.50 1.24 
    Asia/Middle East 0.82 0.03 0.04 
Average duration of residence abroad (in years) 4.5 10.3 5.6 
Number of emigrants with secondary education or higher 0.7 0.5 0.5 
Number of emigrants with paid job 1.1 1.1 0.9 
N = 448 253 285 
    
Individual household member variables    
Intention to emigrate (%) (no intention = 0) 13.1 12.5 30.7 
Age (in years) 34.4 33.7 35.8 
Sex, male (%) (female = 0) 37.5 36.3 36.1 
Married (%) (not married = 0) 62.0 48.8 64.5 
Education (%)    
    No education (= 0) 53.5 67.8 38.1 
    Primary education 13.3 21.0 50.1 
    Secondary education 23.6 8.8 9.2 
    Higher than secondary education 9.6 2.4 2.6 
Having a paid job (%) (no job = 0) 33.4 20.2 27.1 
N = 1180 615 665 
(a) Mean factor scores based on principal components analysis. 
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The majority of migrant-sending households are headed by women, most of 
whom have no education or, at the most, have a primary level of education. Female 
headship in these Islamic countries is often due to the fact household members who 
emigrated are (married) men who leave their spouse behind with, or without, children. On 
average, households have between one and two shadow household members living 
abroad.5 
Perceived income status of the household is obtained from answers of heads of 
household on whether the financial situa tion of the household is insufficient, barely 
sufficient, or sufficient to buy all their basic needs. Migrant-sending households in Egypt 
and Morocco generally perceive their current household’s financial situation as 
satisfactory contrary to such households in Turkey. The bias towards a negative 
perception of the financial situation in Turkish sending households may be a reflection of 
the general pessimistic mood in the society, at the time of the survey, as the economy 
went through several recessions and two serious monetary crises between 1994 and 1997. 
Besides this income variable we have also constructed a wealth variable to test the self-
interest model of remittances (derived from strategic inheritance motives). A household 
wealth-score was derived from the possession of ten household assets and eight indicators 
of housing quality. 6 The method of principle component analysis was used to derive 
weights for each asset and housing quality indicator and an overall household wealth-
status index score (Filmer and Pritchett, 1999; Filmer and Pritchett, 2001; Bollen et al., 
                                                                 
5 More specifically, 87 per cent of the migrant sending households in Egypt have one emigrant, and 98 per 
cent of such households have at the most two emigrants. Figures for Morocco and Turkey are 68 per cent 
and 90 per cent, and 70 per cent and 93 per cent, respectively. 
6 Radio, television, bicycle, cooking stove, lounge suite, sewing machine, car/jeep or truck, telephone, 
video player, refrigerator, number of persons per room, piped water, flush toilet and quality of: walls, 
floors, roof, ceiling, windows/window frames and doors. The linear combination of these 18 variables 
estimated by the first principle component explains 32 per cent, 32 per cent and 26 per cent of the common 
and unique variance of these variables in the case of Egypt, Morocco and Turkey, respectively. 
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2002). To complement the net earnings position we have included a dummy variable to 
see whether rural-urban differences reflect differences in economic opportunities, 
aspirations and values, resulting from differential access to information, infrastructure 
and income. 
With respect to emigrant characteristics one can see that emigrants are mostly 
men, usually married and most of them have a paid job. In all countries, an emigrant is 
often a spouse or a child of the head of the migrant-sending household. Most migrants 
have left their family for quite some years, although there is considerable variation in the 
duration of stay abroad. Moroccan emigrants left their family far earlier than emigrants 
from households in the other two countries: the average duration is about 10.3 years, 
whereas Egyptian and Turkish emigrants have left their country 4.5 and 5.6 years ago. 
Egyptian emigrants generally have a higher level of education and more often hold paid 
jobs than emigrants from Morocco and Turkey. 
It comes as no surprise to find women over-represented among non-migrants, as 
heads of migrant-sending households are often women whereas emigrants are mostly 
men. Regarding education and work the main contrast is between Moroccan and Egyptian 
non-migrants. Among Moroccans, two thirds do not have any form of education and only 
one in five has a paid job. Among Egyptians a majority has no education but a major 
group of non-migrants attained a secondary or higher level of education, categories which 
are rare among Moroccan and Turkish non-migrants. 
The survey contains some information on the type of relationship between the 
emigrant and the head of the migrant-sending household. The number of persons among 
emigrants who are spouse, children, parents, or brothers or sisters. Marital status of 
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emigrants is included (i.e. number of emigrants who are married) because married 
emigrants will have different and more types of loyalties to the migrant-sending 
household than unmarried emigrants.7 Married emigrants who left a spouse and children 
behind are expected to remit money to them, but they may also need to remit to more 
distant kin since marriage involves expansion of the kinship group. 
 
RESULTS 
Remittances: inspired by self-interest or altruism? 
To answer the question what drives the flow of remittances, we estimated equation (1) by 
means of logistic regression analysis. The estimation results are presented in Table 4 where we 
consider the individual country estimates as well as a sample in which the experiences of the 
three countries are pooled. 
In Egypt, the profile of a recipient of remittances is determined by both household 
and emigrant characteristics. Households with the highest likelihood of receiving 
remittances are households headed by women, who perceive the financial status of the 
household as ‘barely sufficient’. Moreover, the likelihood for such (Egyptian) women to 
receive remittances is highest if a spouse or brothers are among the emigrants.8 The 
profile of households in Morocco with the highest likelihood of receiving remittances is 
fully determined by characteristics of their emigrants: male spouses and brothers, who 
generally have none or only a primary level education but who have paid work, primarily  
                                                                 
7 The sex of the emigrants was also considered to be included as an explanatory variable but this sex and 
marital status of the migrant correlated strongly. To prevent issues of multi-collinearity we restricted 
our attention to the marital status of the migrant. 
8 The data do not allow determining whether the spouse of a married emigrant is living in the sending 
household or elsewhere. However, this is supported by indirect evidence. In Egypt, 76 per cent of the 
sending households headed by married women report that remittances abroad come from their spouse. 
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Table 4  Explaining the likelihood of receiving remittances among migrant-sending 
households (by means of logistic regression) 
 
 Dependent variable: likelihood of receiving remittances 
Explanatory variables: Pooled sample Egypt Morocco Turkey 
Househol d variables odds 
ratio 
t-value odds 
ratio 
t-value odds 
ratio 
t-value odds 
ratio 
t-value 
Presence of persons below age 18 1.35 1.26 1.68 1.48 0.78 0.49 1.18 0.34 
Presence of persons above age 65 1.04 0.17 1.04 0.16 0.93 0.15 1.07 0.20 
Household size (exc luding emigrants) 0.97 1.16 0.97 -0.87 1.18 1.54 0.88* 1.84 
Age – head of household 0.99 1.48 1.01 0.95 0.95** 2.25 0.99 0.81 
Female head of household 1.28 1.18 2.02** 2.26 1.52 0.72 0.69 0.94 
Level of education – head of household         
    Primary education 1.35 1.38 1.91* 1.83 0.88 0.23 1.43 1.01 
    Secondary education 0.97 0.10 1.66 1.28 0.22* 1.90 1.36 0.40 
    Higher than secondary education 0.95 0.12 1.76 1.20 0.93 0.07 0.61 0.40 
Perceived income situation         
    Insufficient 0.49** 2.54 0.25** 2.33 0.53 0.69 0.77 0.64 
    Barely sufficient 1.24 1.08 1.66* 1.75 0.62 1.15 2.23** 2.24 
Household wealth 0.87 1.30 0.91 -0.56 1.08 0.34 0.76 1.56 
Rural 1.28 1.23 1.31 0.98 3.28* 1.92 1.11 0.29 
Emigrant variables         
Family ties         
Number of emigrants who are:         
    Spouse of reference person 1.95** 2.21 3.65** 2.34 0.99 0.01 1.99 1.28 
    Children of reference person 1.43* 1.67 1.32 0.68 3.71** 2.28 1.00 0.01 
    Parents of reference person 1.23 0.38 5.28 1.57 0.89 0.21 -a - 
    Brother/sisters of reference person 1.37 1.05 2.44* 1.64 0.77 0.52 1.88 1.34 
Number of married emigrants 1.06 0.40 1.54* 1.80 0.87 0.41 1.31 0.93 
Earnings capacity         
Average duration of stay abroad 1.03* 1.75 1.02 0.85 0.98 0.53 1.08** 2.14 
Number of emigrants in:         
    Europe 0.67** 2.28 1.47 0.98 0.67 1.06 0.48** 1.99 
    Asia/Middle East 1.12 0.50 1.55 1.40 -a - 1.05 0.06 
Number of emigrants with secondary 
education or higher 
0.76* 1.77 0.50** 2.78 0.70 1.10 1.14 0.51 
Number of emigrants with paid job 2.77** 5.25 1.24 0.51 3.67** 3.36 3.52** 4.31 
Average age of emigrants 1.01 0.84 0.96* 1.82 1.07* 1.94 1.02 0.79 
Country variables:         
     Morocco 4.79** 5.28 - - - - - - 
     Turkey 2.23** 2.81 - - - - - - 
     
N 986 448 253 285 
Loglikelihood -538.1 -266.7 -104.1 -150.9 
Nagelkerke Pseudo R2 0.26 0.22 0.30 0.35 
McFadden Pseudo R2 0.16 0.13 0.21 0.22 
** Significance at 5% level, * significance at 10% level. The pooled results are weighted to correct for different sample 
sizes. McFadden Pseudo R2  is defined as: 1 – (ln LA /ln L0), where is L0 the likelihood of the zero model and LA is 
likelihood of the alternative model. Nagelkerke Pseudo R2 is defined as: [1 – (-2L0 /-2 LA)](2/N) ]/ [1 – (-2L0 )](2/N) ]. 
See,e g., Verbeek (2004) and Nagelkerke (1991). 
(a) Variable dropped because of lack of sufficient observation. 
 
 
situated in Europe. In Turkey, households with the highest likelihood of receiving 
remittances are households of which the perceived income situation is poor. If their 
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emigrants have paid work this will significantly increase the likelihood of receiving 
remittances. However, if these emigrants are situated in Europe this will significantly 
decrease receipt of remittances. Higher cost of living in Europe compared to other 
countries of destination may explain this finding. Such a destination effect is also visible 
in the case of Moroccan migrants but the coefficient is not significantly different from 
zero. 
The results in Table 4 do not give a clear verdict on which theory of remittances is 
relevant. The theory of altruism seems to be applicable when one looks at those migrant-
sending households with a ‘barely sufficient’ income position. They are compensated for 
this status in Egypt and Turkey by the receipt of remittances and this is in line with what 
one would expect from altruistic migrant family members. However, the income position 
of the household also gives contradictory outcomes as households with insufficient 
income are not likely to be compensated by remittances, as one would expect from the 
altruism model. On the contrary, those poor households are even less likely to receive 
remittances compared to households with sufficient income. This seems to be especially 
relevant for the Egyptian case. An alternative possible explanation for this paradoxical 
finding is that at the time of the interview, heads of household perceived the current 
financial situation as satisfactory but that the household financial situation only improved 
in recent years. The data provide some circumstantial evidence for this. For a relatively 
small number of sending households, information is available on the perceived financial 
situation of the household at the time of emigration of the first emigrant leaving the 
household. Some background analysis shows that in Turkey and Morocco remittances-
receiving households show more often a significant improvement in their perceived 
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financial situation of the household than non-receiving households. In Egypt, such 
significant improvements were not observed. 
Contrary to conventional wisdom, migrant-sending households are less likely to 
receive remittances from emigrants with a secondary or higher level of education. This 
effect seems to be especially relevant to the case of Egypt. The self- interest model of 
remittances suggests that this relationship should be the opposite: higher educated 
household members are sent abroad to generate income for the family in the country of 
origin. Although this result may perhaps not be in line with theory, it is in line with 
results of recent cross-country panel study (Faini, 2003) on the link between skilled 
migration and remittances. Faini concludes that migrants with a higher education, in spite 
of their potentially larger earnings and propensity to generate remittances, remit less 
because their move more often reflects a permanent move. Their attachment to the 
household becomes progressively weaker and so does their willingness to remit. The 
latter is not corroborated by our findings. On the contrary, as time goes by, emigrants 
may come in a position to generate sufficient income and live up to (financial) 
expectations of those who remain behind. There are some signs, most notably in Turkey, 
that time abroad has a small but positive effect on the possibility of receiving remittances.  
Another conspicuous finding is that household wealth does not affect the 
likelihood of receipt of remittances.  Coefficients are mostly negative suggesting that the 
altruistic model is applicable but the effect is statistically insignificant. It certainly  
suggests that the model of ‘self- interest’ – captured by the strategic inheritance motive -  
as put forward by, e.g., Lucas and Stark (1985) is not applicable. 
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What does seem clear is that the strength of ties between emigrants and sending 
households is important as well as the earning capacity of the emigrants as measured by 
their employment status. The effect of family ties seems to be especially relevant when 
emigrants are spouses or children of the head of the migrant-sending household. 
However, the effect is different across countries. In Egypt, the spousal relation is very 
important, in Morocco it is the relationship with the children staying abroad who are 
important, and, oddly, the strength of the family relationship plays no role at all in 
Turkish migrant sending households. The difference between Egypt and Morocco may be 
explained by the type of migration in these two countries. In Egypt, migration is 
dominated by men who work abroad for some fixed duration, their employment is mostly 
found in the oil producing states of the Middle East, and it is the (social) norm in 
deciding to move abroad that the wife stays behind. In Morocco, migration is mostly 
directed at Europe and of a permanent nature and the relation between the family at home 
and the migrants is mostly a parent-child relation. 
In summary, one cannot clearly pinpoint altruistic or motives of self- interest as 
sole driving forces behind the receipt of remittances. Each country tells a different story 
and within a country both motives can be defended as driving forces. However, we can 
say that for the explanation of receipt of remittances the characteristics of emigrants are 
far more important than the characteristics of migrant-sending households. More 
specifically, the strength of family ties between emigrants and the migrant-sending 
household and the employment status of emigrants increase the probability of receipt of 
remittances. 
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Remittances: signals of migration benefits? 
Does receipt of remittances encourage or discourage emigration intentions of potential 
emigrants in sending households? A simple cross-tabulation in Table 5, with emigration 
intentions split up by individuals who live in households that did and did not receive 
remittances, suggests that this is so for each country but that it is most clearly so for 
Morocco and Turkey.  
 
Table 5  Average emigration intentions by households receiving remittancesa 
 
 Emigration intentions in (no = 0, yes = 1): 
Individuals living in migrant-sending 
households, who: 
Egypt Morocco Turkey 
Received remittances 0.14 0.14* 0.36** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) 
Did not receive remittances 0.12 0.07* 0.24** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
(a) Standard error of means in brackets. * Means are significantly different at 5% level of statistical 
significance; ** idem but significance at 1% level. 
 
 
In Morocco, the intention to emigrate doubles: 7 per cent of the non-migrants living in 
non-recipient households state they want to emigrate, whereas 14 per cent of the non-
migrants living in households that received remittances express such an intention. In 
Turkey the corresponding per centages are 24 per cent and a staggering 36 per cent. The 
main question is, of course, whether these significant differences in emigration intentions 
are driven by characteristics of non-migrants and their relationship with emigrants, or by 
the signalling function of remittances.  
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Table 6 Testing the role of remittances in emigration intentions among non-migrants in 
migrant-sending households (by means of logistic regression) 
 
 Dependent variable: intention to emigrate (no = 0, yes = 1) 
Explanatory variables: Pooled sample Egypt Morocco Turkey 
Remittances variable odds 
ratio 
t-value odds 
ratio 
t-value odds 
ratio 
t-value Odds 
ratio 
t-value 
Having received remittances 1.41** 2.45 1.39 1.53 2.65** 2.18 1.32 1.24 
Individual household member 
variables 
        
Age 1.09** 2.17 1.17 1.35 1.12 1.00 1.09 1.64 
Age squared 0.99** 3.45 0.99* 1.96 0.99 1.57 0.99** 2.41 
Men 2.67** 6.11 3.62** 4.79 6.71** 4.83 1.56* 1.77 
Married 0.65** 2.48 0.58* 1.80 0.61 1.00 0.74 1.23 
Education         
    Primary 1.27 1.39 2.34** 2.39 0.59 1.29 1.32 1.04 
    Secondary 1.42* 1.78 3.12** 3.66 0.35* 1.75 1.20 0.43 
    Higher than secondary 1.78** 1.99 4.47** 3.91 1.21 0.26 0.51 0.92 
Having a paid job 1.27 1.51 1.71** 2.21 0.97 0.08 1.32 1.11 
Household variables          
Presence of persons below age 18 1.57** 2.18 1.45 1.04 2.47* 1.93 1.50 1.19 
Presence of persons above age 65 1.12 0.75 1.29 1.02 0.28** 2.69 1.58* 1.87 
Household size, excluding emigrants 0.97 1.18 1.02 0.73 0.87* 1.71 0.96 0.84 
Perceived income situation         
    Insufficient 1.95** 3.02 1.16 0.24 4.00** 2.00 1.69* 1.90 
    Barely sufficient 1.96** 4.64 1.34 1.04 3.58** 3.71 1.65** 2.10 
Household wealth 1.03 0.35 1.20 1.14 0.83 0.96 0.92 0.63 
Rural 1.55** 2.68 1.15 0.54 0.39** 1.99 1.63** 1.98 
Emigrant variables         
Family ties         
Number of emigrants who are:         
     Spouses 1.78** 2.40 0.90 0.23 1.34 0.64 3.15** 3.02 
     Children 0.90 0.64 0.85 0.59 0.43** 2.30 1.14 0.65 
     Parents 0.70 1.16 0.74 0.42 0.48 1.55 0.30 1.11 
     Brother/sisters 1.03 0.16 0.61 1.26 1.31 0.66 1.09 0.30 
Number of married emigrants 1.09 0.63 1.26 1.16 1.09 0.29 1.18 0.91 
Earnings capacity         
Average duration of stay abroad 0.99 0.63 1.00 0.02 0.95** 1.96 1.01 0.22 
Number of emigrants in:         
    Europe 1.03 0.25 1.35 0.90 1.01 0.03 0.78 1.12 
    Asia/Middle East 0.97 0.19 1.26 0.94 0.90 0.09 0.67 0.63 
Number of emigrants with secondary 
education or higher 
1.04 0.40 0.84 0.80 0.82 0.70 1.44** 2.21 
Number of emigrants with paid job 1.23 1.49 0.68 1.10 1.85* 1.84 1.07 0.36 
Average age of emigrants 1.01 1.21 1.02 1.05 1.02 0.94 1.01 0.31 
Country variables:         
     Morocco 0.93 0.29 - - - - - - 
     Turkey 3.29** 5.03 - - - - - - 
     
N 2460 1180 615 665 
Loglikelihood -943.5 -320.7 -167.4 -343.1 
Nagelkerke Pseudo R2 0.30 0.38 0.36 0.25 
McFadden Pseudo R2 0.21 0.30 0.28 0.16 
** Significance at 5% level, * significance at 10% level. The pooled results are weighted to correct for different sample 
sizes. 
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To test the hypothesis that remittances convey the message to those staying behind that it 
would be profitable to also move abroad a model of emigration intentions - equation (2) 
presented earlier - is estimated by means of logistic regression analysis. Table 6 presents 
the estimation results. 
Before we discuss the relevance of remittances as signals, we first look at some of 
the most notable estimation results describing the emigration intentions of non-migrants. 
Previous studies of emigration intentions show that age, sex, marital status, level of 
education and work status of non-migrants are important predictors of emigration 
intentions (e.g. De Jong, 1994; Puri and Ritzema, 2000; Taylor, 1999; Van Dalen et al. 
2005). Regarding the household characteristics, these studies also show that emigration 
intentions of non-migrants are highest in households with high financial dependency on 
emigrated members, with a low to moderate level of economic welfare9, and with a 
relatively high number of household members living abroad. The estimates presented in 
Table 6 corroborate these earlier findings. For the pooled sample one can say that the 
profile of a potential emigrant is that of a person who is young, male, single, with a 
relatively high level of education. Such a person is most likely living in a remittances-
receiving rural household in which young children are present and in which the financial 
situation of the household is insufficient. It is most likely that in such households a (male) 
spouse is among the emigrants. 
However, the profiles of a person with high emigration intentions differ in the 
three countries. In Egypt, such a person is typically a man with a relatively high level of 
education with a paid job, a profile that fits well with that of the high-skilled Egyptian 
                                                                 
9 A number of studies report that emigration is not considered an option by the poorest households (Taylor, 
1999; Bilsborrow et al., 1997) 
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emigrants in the oil-producing nations of the Middle East, the main destination area of 
Egyptian emigrants. The dominant role played by men in migration also fits in well with 
the social norms about migration that persist in Egypt (Van Dalen et al. 2005). In 
Morocco, the person with high emigration intentions is most likely a man in a household 
in which children are living, and where the household financial situation is perceived to 
be insufficient. However, such households are most likely to have members living abroad 
with a paid job. When they have children who live abroad their migration intentions are 
clearly dampened, which could indicate that remittances are effective in that it stops 
parents from joining their children abroad. In Turkey, non-migrants with emigration 
intentions are men living in households in rural areas, households of which the current 
financial status is perceived to be insufficient, and where migrant household members are 
persons with a relatively high level of education. The strong pulling force of family ties is 
apparent when we look at Table 6: for those individuals living in households where the 
male spouse of the head of migrant-sending household lives abroad the intention to 
migrate is 3.2 times higher than those persons who do not have this connection. 
The main focus of this section is, of course, to examine the signalling effect of 
remittances in relation to the formation of emigration intentions. The main conclusion to 
be derived from the pooled sample is that receipt of remittances exerts a clear positive 
effect on emigration intentions of non-migrants in migrant-sending households. The 
likelihood that non-migrants in remittances-receiving households state emigration 
intentions is about 1.4 times the likelihood of such persons in non-receiving households. 
This means that emigration intentions in sending households are not only a reflection of 
the quality of the relationship between senders and receivers of remittances. 
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Remittances can also be interpreted as signals of financial attractiveness of 
destination countries. Our findings point to significant differences between the three 
countries. In Egypt and Turkey, the effect of remittances on emigration is positive but not 
significantly different from zero, and only in Morocco one can say that remittances have 
a clear signalling effect. In the case of Morocco, non-migrants in receiving households 
have emigration intentions which are about 2.7 times higher than that of non-migrants in 
non-receiving households. However, running separate regressions without the emigrant 
variables (Ei) shows that also in Egypt and Turkey remittances have a positive influence 
on migration intentions. The inclusion of emigrant variables, as done in Table 6, 
completely neutralises the effect of remittances on emigration intentions in the case of 
Egypt and Turkey. This suggests that in the latter two countries, emigration intentions of 
potential emigrants are determined by the strength of family ties between emigrants and 
migrant-sending households, whereas in Morocco, in addition to network effects, receipt 
of remittances has a positive effect on emigration intentions. In Morocco, remittances are 
apparently interpreted as signals of financial success of those who emigrated and 
therefore worth following by those remaining behind. 
Although one cannot make a firm case for Turkey and Egypt that remittances 
have a signalling function, one can also not reject the reverse position stated by Stark 
(1999) that remittances imply that the intention to emigrate should be significantly lower 
among remittances-receiving households than the intentions in non-receiving households. 
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CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
Which factors determine the receipt of remittances? Is it the income position of the 
households staying behind or is it the net earnings capacity of migrants? We examined 
the effects of a number of migrant-sending household and emigrant characteristics on the 
probability that such households received remittances. Net earnings capacity of migrants 
and their commitment to live up to promises of emigrants appeared to be important 
determinants and not so much the net earnings capacity and wealth of the sending 
household residing in the country of origin. Thus, the ability of emigrants to generate 
remittances and the strength of family ties are more crucial to the explanation of receipt 
of remittances than the economic needs of households. However, the estimation results 
do not yield unambiguous conclusions about whether these remittances are inspired by 
altruism or enlightened self- interest. Each country tells a different story and within each 
country there are signs that both altruism and self- interest are at work. To some extent 
this is inherent to the various roles which remittances play in actual practice. In their 
extensive review of the causes and consequences of remittances Rapoport and Docquier 
(2005) mention a host of motives behind the sending of remittances, such as plain 
altruism, remittances as a family loan arrangement, and more intricate motives such as 
insurance, strategic bequest and the use of remittances to buy a wide range of services 
taking care of the migrants’ assets or relatives at home. Their conclusion is that the main 
short-coming of the richness of models of remittances is that discriminating tests require 
a large number of variables. In this paper we have used quite a diverse number of theory-
based variables but the empirics of remittances still offers puzzles. The fact that one  
cannot unambiguously pinpoint the character of remittances is something that also comes 
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across in the empirical contribution by VanWey (2004). In part, the inconclusive nature 
of empirical research is understandable. First of all, one cannot expect remittances to be 
driven by a single motive. Secondly, the inconclusiveness may be connected to the 
difficulties in modelling altruism and the resulting transfers within the family. Even 
someone who is purely led by altruistic motives may still act in accordance with some 
social contract. The main divergence between models of altruism and self- interest then 
becomes a distinction between implicit and explicit contracts. And testing the predictions 
of both models and pinpointing the true altruist among remitters seems to resemble a 
mission impossible. 
Our second contribution deals with the real effects of remittances on decisions 
made by non-migrants of migrant-sending households. We argued that, on the one hand, 
remittances contribute to household income and, if sufficient, the effect might be that it 
discourages emigration intentions of potential emigrants. On the other hand, remittances 
may be interpreted as messages of financial success of those who emigrated and this may 
stimulate potential emigrants to also emigrate. Which of these opposing lines of thought 
is now supported by empirical evidence? A novel finding was that, overall, the receipt of 
remittances does have a positive effect on emigration intentions.  
The finding that remittances can bring about such perverse effects merits some 
additional concluding comments. Policy makers in less developed as well as developed 
countries have used the implicit assumption that remittances are beneficial for the 
countries of origin, and some less developed countries, such as Morocco, have even used 
these possible benefits to underpin their emigration policy. Recent macro-economic 
research by Chami et al. (2005) points out that remittances may not be so beneficial for 
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the countries at large. Although the present research is micro-economically oriented, the 
findings of this study point to an important consequence of remittances that may explain 
the negative macro-economic effects of remittances: remittances may trigger additional 
emigration. In other words, remittances may contribute to new flows of emigration and 
possibly in the direction of the countries where the remitters reside. Remittances thereby 
strengthen the phenomenon of chain migration, or - to rephrase this with more care - 
remittances certainly do not weaken the chain. 
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